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Basel II capital requirements are risk sensitive because they rely on the credit quality of 
borrowers, which means that in a downturn of the business cycle, when capital might be 
needed to absorb losses, capital requirements are also expected to be higher. This 
procyclicality may lead to excessive risk-taking during good times and to a credit crunch during 
bad times, amplifying the business cycle effects. Several approaches were proposed to address 
this problem.  
 
The new Basel III framework directly addresses this issue, mainly through the implementation 
of the countercyclical capital buffer. This buffer aims to protect the banking system from 
periods of excessive credit growth, ensuring that the financial sector, as a whole, has enough 
capital to maintain the flow of credit into real economy in stress periods and that capital 
requirements do not constraint credit supply. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to discuss the implementation in Portugal of the Basel III 
countercyclical capital buffer  framework. The analysis was organized in two main parts, 
answering two different questions.  
  
First, the historical performance of the common guide Credit-to-GDP gap, proposed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to signal the built up of the countercyclical 
capital buffer, was tested. The results showed that the guide can signal the build up of the 
buffer complying with the objectives set. However, according to the results, some alterations 
to the methodology proposed may need to be considered, in order to improve the calibration 
for the Portuguese economy. For instance, a smoothing parameter of 1 600 instead of 400 000 
to compute the trend using a recursive Hodrick-Prescott filter may provide better results, while 
changing the lower and upper thresholds might also be necessary. 
 
The second objective was to assess if Portuguese banks would respond to an increase of 
capital requirements by constraining loan supply or by other means. To do so it was used an 
approach based on the previous work of Francis and Osborne (2012), which studied the effects 
of regulatory capital requirements on capital, lending and balance sheet management of UK 
banks. The results suggest that Portuguese banks tend to react to capital requirement 
increases by raising the levels of regulatory capital. 
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Banking system regulators impose minimum capital ratios to banks, which depend on the 
coverage of risk weighted assets (RWA) by the level of own funds held by the institution. Basel 
II capital requirements, in place today, are risk sensitive because RWA depend on the credit 
quality of borrowers. This means that in a downturn of the business cycle, when overall credit 
quality decreases, RWA tend to be higher and in good times tend to be lower for the exact 
opposite reasons. This procyclicality gives a wrong incentive to banks that may lead to 
excessive risk-taking during good times and to a credit crunch during bad times, amplifying the 
business cycle effects. 
 
This problem led to the necessity of presenting solutions to smooth the effects of procyclicality 
and, in consequence, several approaches were proposed. The new Basel III framework directly 
addresses this problem, mainly through the implementation of the countercyclical capital 
buffer, which aims to protect the banking system from periods of excessive credit growth, 
ensuring that the financial sector, as a whole, has enough capital to maintain the flow of credit 
into real economy in stress periods and that capital requirements do not constraint credit 
supply. To do so, this buffer should be imposed by national authorities if they believe to be in 
the presence of excessive credit growth that is contributing to the build up of system-wide risk 
(constraining it) and should be released in the presence of a crisis or when the risks identified 
subside. Although national authorities should apply proper judgment in buffer decisions, the 
variable Credit-to-GDP gap, explained afterwards, was proposed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) to be a common guide in signaling the build up of the 
countercyclical capital buffer. 
  
The objective of this thesis is to discuss the implementation in Portugal of the Basel III 
countercyclical capital buffer framework. The analysis was organized in two main parts, 
answering two different questions.  
  
First, the historical performance of the common guide Credit-to-GDP gap, proposed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to signal the built up of the countercyclical 
capital buffer, was tested.  
 
The second objective was to assess if Portuguese banks would respond to an increase of 
capital requirements by constraining loan supply or by other means. To do so it was used an 





approach based on the previous work of Francis and Osborne (2012), which studied the effects 
of regulatory capital requirements on capital, lending and balance sheet management of UK 
banks.  
 
The rest of the document is organized as follows: 
 
1. The second chapter will address the importance of capital and the evolution of 
international capital regulation. It will also address procyclicality in capital regulation 
and the role of the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer in mitigating it, while also 
reviewing some of the related literature; 
 
2. The third chapter will explain how the common guide Credit-to-GDP will be 
implemented and assess its historical performance in Portugal; 
 
3. The fourth chapter will analyze how Portuguese banks adjust their balance sheets to 
comply with changes in capital requirements; 
 
4. Finally, conclusions are presented in the fifth chapter. 
2 International capital regulation 
2.1 Capital 
 
It is common for financial institutions to incur in losses due to their activity and they must be 
prepared to absorb these losses in order to maintain themselves operating in the long run. The 
losses can be of different magnitude and probability, as shown in Figure 1, and should be dealt 
with in different ways. The expected loss, due to its high probability of occurring, should be 
covered by the regular activity with an adequate pricing of the products and provisioning, 
while the unexpected loss, which is not expected to be exceeded with some degree of 
confidence (usually 99% or 99.9%), should be absorbed by capital. This means that an 
adequate capital level prevents financial institutions from failure when extreme losses occur. 
The stress loss is the unexpected loss level which it is judged to be too expensive to hold 
capital against, meaning that this level of losses leads to insolvency.    
 
 






Figure 1 – The loss probability function 
 
The failure of a financial institution may cause serious damage in the financial system where it 
is integrated and also in the real economy, due to the propagation of losses across banks, 
which in turn may lead to the default of other financial institutions (systemic risk) and to a 
reduction of the credit supplied to households and corporations, deteriorating the economy. In 
order to prevent these negative impacts on the financial system and economy, regulators must 
ensure that banks hold adequate levels of capital, preventing them from defaulting. 
 
Before 1988, many regulators of different countries imposed minimum levels of capital 
coverage over total assets. However, the definitions of capital and minimum levels required 
were not homogeneous across jurisdictions, which lead to unequal conditions to banks 
competing worldwide, giving an edge to the ones with slack regulation. Additionally, due to 
the existence of new transactions accounted as off-balance sheet items (e.g. over-the-counter 
derivatives), the amount of capital required should not be based only on total assets, being 
required a better measure of the risks taken by banks. 
 
2.2 Basel I 
 
These constrains were behind the creation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 
1974 and to the subsequent first approach to set international risk-based standards for capital 
adequacy (“The 1988 BIS Accord”). Despite of maintaining a minimum standard based on the 
ratio of capital to total assets, where banks were required to have a minimum multiple of 20, a 





new standard, based on the bank’s total credit exposure, was introduced and became known 
as the Cooke ratio. 
 
The Cooke ratio consisted on the coverage of risk-weighted assets (RWA), which include off-
balance sheet items, by total capital and a minimum of 8% was set. Total capital was 
composed by Tier 1 Capital, with a better loss-absorbing quality and a minimum requirement 
of 4%, and by Tier 2 Capital, also known as Supplementary Capital.     
 
To compute the risk-weighted assets, a risk-weight was applied to each exposure based on the 
asset category, as shown in Table 1 (example for on-balance sheet items). The exposure of off-
balance sheets items consisted in a credit equivalent amount, which for non-derivatives 
derived from applying a credit conversion factor (CCF) to the principal amount and for 
derivatives resulted from adding to the exposure an add-on factor, to reflect the possibility of 
increasing the exposure in the future (the add-on factor is a percentage of the principal and 
depends on the residual maturity of the position and the type of underlying).     
 
Risk weight  
(%) 
Asset category 
0 Cash, gold bullion, claims on OECD governments such 
as Treasury bonds or insured residential mortgages. 
20 Claims on OECD banks and OECD public sector 
entities such as securities issued by US government 
agencies or claims on municipalities. 
50 Uninsured residential mortgage loans. 
100 All other claims, such as corporate bonds and less-
developed country debt, claims on non-OECD banks, 
real estate, premises, plant, and equipment. 
Table 1 – Risk weights for on-balance sheet items   
 
In 1998, it was implemented the “1996 Amendment” to the original accord. This amendment 
introduced a capital requirement to cover exposures to market risks in addition to the existing 
capital requirement to cover exposures to credit risks. To calculate the market risk capital 
requirements, banks were allowed to use a standardized approach or an “internal model-
based approach” (based on internal value-at-risk measurements), depending on the abilities of 
different banks in risk management. Most large banks preferred to use the latter model, 
because it led to lower capital requirements, due to diversification effects (Hull, 2010). 





Despite the advantages brought by the 1988 BIS Accord in the improvement of the level of 
capital held by banks and consequently in the stability of the banking system, its simplicity did 
not allow to capture well credit risk, because the risk weight to be applied to a position only 
depended on the asset class, ignoring the creditworthiness of the counterparty. In 1999 a new 
set of rules was proposed by the BCBS and the final set of what has become known as Basel II 
was published in 2004 and implemented in 2007. 
 
2.3 Basel II 
 
Basel II is based on three “pillars”, namely, (1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory 
review and (3) market discipline. Concerning minimum capital requirements, two innovations 
relatively to the 1996 Amendment took place. First, the minimum capital requirement for 
credit risk reflects the credit rating of counterparties set by authorized External Credit 
Assessment Institutions (ECAI). Second, a new capital requirement for operational risk was 
established. This means that the total capital requirement under Basel II is 
 
     (                                                      ) 
Equation 1 – Capital requirements under Basel II 
 
For credit risk measurement, institutions are allowed to choose from one of three available 
options: 
 
1. The standardized approach; 
 
2. The foundation internal ratings based (IRB) approach; 
 
3. The advanced IRB approach. 
 
The standardized approach differs from Basel I in the additional risk sensitivity through the use 
of a wider range of risk weights linked to external ratings. As can be observed in Table 2, the 
risk weights depend not only on the counterparty class, but also on its rating. 
 
 

























Sovereigns RW 0 20 50 100 150 100 




RW 20 50 100 150 100 






20 50 100 150 100 
RW 
(short-term) 
20 50 150 100 
Corporate RW 20 50 100 150 100 
Table 2 – Risk weights (as percentage of principal) under Basel II’s standardized approach 
 
Under the IRB approach, capital requirements depend on the Probability of default (PD), Loss 
given default (LGD), Exposure at default (EAD) and Maturity adjustment (MA). For corporate, 
sovereign and bank exposures, under the foundation IRB approach, banks compute PD and the 
remaining risk parameters are set by the regulator, while under the advanced IRB approach, 
banks compute their own estimates of PD, LGD, EAD and MA. Under both IRB approaches, for 
the calculation of capital requirements for retail exposures, banks provide their own estimates 
of PD, LGD and EAD (in this case there is no maturity adjustment). 
 
2.4 Basel III 
 
On June 2011, it was published the final version of the original December 2010 Basel III 
document entitled “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems”. This framework was designed to strengthen capital and liquidity rules in 
order to promote a more resilient banking sector, able to absorb shocks arising from financial 
and economic stress, and by doing so, reducing the risk of damaging the real economy. 
 
These new rules also intend to reflect the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis, 
which began in 2007/2008. The main drivers of this crisis, according to the BCBS1, were the 
build up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage, a gradual erosion of the level and 
quality of the capital base and also the insufficient liquidity buffers held by some banks. The 
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crisis was also amplified by the procyclical deleveraging process and the linkage between 
systemic institutions, through complex transactions. 
 
In order to address these problems, the framework’s main objectives are: 
 
1. Raising the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base; 
2. Enhancing risk coverage; 
3. Supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a leverage ratio; 
4. Reducing procyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers; 
5. Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness; 
6. Introducing a global liquidity standard. 
 
The new minimum capital requirements, as can be observed in Table 3, are imposed not only 
to Tier 1 Capital and Total Capital as in Basel II, but introduce the concept of Common Equity 






Tier 1 Capital Total Capital 
Minimum 4.5 6.0 8.0 
Conservation buffer 2.5 
  
Minimum plus conservation buffer 7.0 8.5 10.5 
Countercyclical buffer range 0 – 2.5     
Table 3 - Capital requirements and buffers (all numbers in percent) 
  
The introduction of the capital requirements for Common Equity Tier 1 serves the objective of 
raising the quality of the capital base as it is basically composed by common shares and 
retained earnings. The capital conservation buffer, comprised of Common Equity Tier 1, 
intends to ensure that banks build up and maintain an excess of high quality capital outside of 
periods of stress, through the retaining of earnings, which can be used to absorb future losses. 
The countercyclical buffer is designed with the purpose of reducing procyclicality. This will be 
discussed in more detail on the next sections (section 2.5 discusses procyclicality and section 
2.6 addresses the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer). 





The Basel III framework, which should be fully implemented in 1 January 2019, started its 
phase-in arrangements in 2013 as shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4 – Basel III phase-in arrangements 
 
The CRD IV package transposes Basel III into the European Union legal framework and entered 
into force on 17 July 2013. Institutions are required to apply the new rules from the 1 January 




Basel II capital requirements are risk sensitive because they rely on the credit quality of 
borrowers, as mentioned before. Under the standard approach, the credit quality is reflected 
by the borrower’s external rating, when available, and under the IRB approach on the 
borrower’s probability of default. This means that in a downturn of the business cycle, when 
capital might be needed to absorb losses, capital requirements are also expected to be higher 
and, as shown in the work of Kashyap and Stein (2004), under the IRB approach this increase 
of the capital requirements might be substantial. This procyclicality may lead to excessive risk-
taking during good times and to a credit crunch during bad times, amplifying the business cycle 
effects.  
 





According to the BCBS2, “one of the most destabilizing elements of the crisis has been the 
procyclical amplification of financial shocks throughout the banking system, financial markets 
and the broader economy”. The BSBC also claims that “losses incurred in the banking sector 
can be extremely large when a downturn is preceded by a period of excess credit growth. These 
losses can destabilise the banking sector and spark a vicious circle, whereby problems in the 
financial system can contribute to a downturn in the real economy that then feeds back on to 
the banking sector.” 
 
Although there is some agreement that the effect of procyclicality of the Basel II capital 
requirements should be mitigated and that it should be done without throwing out the risk-
sensitiveness of capital regulation regime, different solutions were proposed by several 
authors. 
 
Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue that having a single time-invariant “risk curve”—that maps 
credit-risk measures (such as the PD) into capital charges—is, in general, suboptimal. These 
authors propose the use of several point-in-time risk curves (several confidence levels), as 
displayed in Figure 2, with each curve corresponding to different macroeconomic conditions 
(for the same probability of default, the capital charge should be lower in bad times of the 
business cycle). The authors suggest two equivalent ways of accomplishing the shift between 
curves, either by reducing the minimum capital ratio required in a recession or by a reduction 
of the risk weights assigned to loans of varying risk profiles.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Kashyap and Stein (2004) Family of risk curves  
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Repullo, Saurina, & Trucharte (2010) also show that Basel II capital requirements move 
significantly along the business cycle (more than 50% from peak to trough). Using the Basel II 
formula to calculate capital requirements, their analysis was based on an estimation of point-
in-time (PIT) PDs resulting from a logistic model of the one-year-ahead probabilities of default 
of Spanish firms during the period 1987-2008. They also tested two different solutions to 
mitigate the cyclicality of these requirements over the business cycle. The first procedure 
consisted in smoothing the input of the Basel II formula by using some through-the-cycle (TTC) 
adjustment of the PDs and the second in smoothing the output of the formula computed from 
the PIT PDs. For the latter they tested different adjustments based on aggregate information 
(the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the rate of growth of bank credit, 
and the return of the stock market) and on individual bank information (the rate of growth of 
banks’ portfolios of commercial and industrial loans). The results showed that the best 
procedures are either to smooth the input of the Basel II formula by using TTC PDs or to 
smooth the output with a multiplier based on GDP growth. They also concluded that the latter 
solution is better in terms of simplicity, transparency, and consistency with banks’ risk pricing 
and risk management systems. 
 
Another approach to deal with the problem is through countercyclical bank capital buffers that 
mitigate bank procyclicality in credit supply. In Spain the build up of these buffers is 
accomplished by the use of dynamic provisions, which are not related to bank specific losses 
and are forward-looking provisions, allowing the build up of a buffer from retained profits in 
good times that can then be used to cover the realized losses in bad times (Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydró, & Saurina, 2013). Dynamic provisions are formula based, being the total loan loss 
provisions for a period (flow) the sum of the Specific plus General Provisions. General 
Provisions are computed by the following formula: 
 
                               (   
                    
      
)        
Equation 2 – General provisions simplification formula in Spain (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & Saurina, 2013) 
 
where        is the stock of loans at the end of period   and         its variation from the 
end of period     to the end of period   (positive in a lending expansion, negative in a credit 
decline).   and   are parameters set by the Banco de España (  is an estimate of the percent 
latent loss in the loan portfolio, while   is the average along the cycle of specific provisions in 
relative terms.  





Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & Saurina (2013) studied the effects of dynamic provisioning in 
Spain in the period between 1999 and 2010 and concluded that the buffering stemming from it 
reduces credit supply in good times (when more risk creeps into bank balance sheets) and 
supports bank lending in bad times, with less need for costly governmental bail-outs and/or 
expansive monetary policy.  
 
2.6 Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
 
The Basel III framework also addresses this problem by the implementation of the 
countercyclical buffer, which aims to protect the banking system from periods of excessive 
credit growth, ensuring that the financial sector, as a whole, has enough capital to maintain 
the flow of credit into real economy in stress periods and that capital requirements do not 
constraint credit supply.  
 
The buffer, to be filled with Common Equity Tier3, should be imposed by national authorities if 
they believe to be in the presence of excessive credit growth that is contributing to the build 
up of system-wide risk. It will assume values within the range of zero to 2.5% of risk weighted 
assets4 and extends the magnitude of the conservation buffer, as presented in Table 5. 
 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
(including other fully loss absorbing capital) 
Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.75% 
(within 1st quartile of buffer) 
100% 
>5.75% - 7.0% 
(within 2nd quartile of buffer) 
80% 
>7.0% - 8.25% 
(within 3th quartile of buffer) 
60% 
>8.25% - 9.5% 
(within 4th quartile of buffer) 
40% 
> 9.5% 
(Above top of buffer) 
0% 
Table 5 - Individual bank minimum capital conservation standards, when a bank is subject to a 2.5% 
countercyclical requirement 
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 For the moment only Common Equity Tier 1 should be used to meet the buffer. However, the 
Committee is reviewing the possibility of allowing other forms of capital.    
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 National authorities can implement a range of additional macroprudential tools, including a buffer in 
excess of 2.5% for banks in their jurisdiction, if this is deemed appropriate in their national context. 
However, the international reciprocity provisions set out in this regime treat the maximum 
countercyclical buffer as 2.5%. 





The specific buffer requirement for each bank is based on a weighted average of the capital 
buffers determined by each jurisdiction where the bank has credit exposure (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2010).  
 
Increases in the countercyclical buffer will have to be announced at least a year earlier, in 
order to assure that banks have enough time to comply with the new capital requirements. On 
the contrary, decreases in the buffer may take effect immediately to mitigate the risk of credit 
crunches due to higher capital requirements imposed by regulators (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2010). 
 
It is expected for authorities to define an internationally common guide for the buffer that can 
be a starting point for decisions concerning the buffer. The Bank for International Settlements 
presents an extensive analysis of the properties of a broad range of indicator variables and the 
credit-to-GDP gap had the best performance. Another advantage of this indicator is being 
based on credit, as constraining excessive credit growth is also an objective of the  
countercyclical capital buffer. This guide does not always work well in every jurisdiction, and 
that is why judgment has an important role in this regime. In order to guide authorities in their 
judgment, the BCBS defined a set of principles included in the document Guidance for national 
authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010), as follows: 
 
1. Objectives: “Buffer decisions should be guided by the objectives to be achieved by the 
buffer, namely to protect the banking system against potential future losses when 
excess credit growth is associated with an increase in system-wide risk.” 
 
2. Common reference guide: “The credit/GDP guide is a useful common reference point in 
taking buffer decisions. It does not need to play a dominant role in the information 
used by authorities to take and explain buffer decisions. Authorities should explain the 
information used, and how it is taken into account in formulating buffer decisions.” 
 
3. Risk of misleading signals: “Assessments of the information contained in the credit/GDP 
guide and any other guides should be mindful of the behaviour of the factors that can 
lead them to give misleading signals.” 
 





4. Prompt release: “Promptly releasing the buffer in times of stress can help to reduce the 
risk of the supply of credit being constrained by regulatory capital requirements.” 
 
5. Other macroprudential tools: “The buffer is an important instrument in a suite of 
macroprudential tools at the disposal of the authorities.” 
 
With the objective of giving credibility to the buffer decisions, authorities should disclose the 
information used in the process. It is also important that capital buffer decisions should be 
updated frequently to mitigate the risk of the buffer not being in line with the credit cycle (the 
BCBS suggests reviews on a quarterly or more frequent basis (Basel Committee on Banking 




In the document Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer 
is presented a series of graphics for several countries which allows observing the past 
performance of the credit-to-GDP gap as a signaling variable for the buffer decisions and for 
most of the countries this indicator performed well. In this chapter will be presented some 
conclusions presented by several authors regarding the performance of the credit-to-GDP gap 
and its historical performance in Portugal will be assessed. 
 
Repullo and Saurina (2011) argue that the Credit-to-GDP gap (deviation of Credit-to-GDP to its 
trend) is negatively correlated with GDP growth and an automatic application of the buffer 
regulation based on this variable would have an effect oposite to the intended, that is, the 
capital requirements woud increase in bad times and decrease in good times. The authors 
identify two reasons as the potencial sources of these problems, being the first the fact that 
credit usually lags business cycles and the second is that the use of credit-to-GDP ratio 
deviations from its trend intensifies the problem because time will pass before the ratio 
crosses the trend. They conclude that the credit-to-GDP should be abandoned as a common 
guide and propose to correct the procyclicality of risk-sensitive capital requirements with a 
business cycle multiplier, as proposed by Repullo, Saurina and Trucharte (2010), combined by a 
variety of the Spanish forward looking loan loss provisions, to assure that capital buffers and 
provisions increase in good times and can be used in bad times. 
 





Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2011) studied the performance of different variables in 
signaling the level of the countercyclical capital buffer (36 countries and about 40 crisis were 
analysed) and concluded that the credit-to-GDP gap had the best performance signaling the 
build up of the buffer and that other variables, as credit spreads, perform better in signaling 
the release phase (however, the performance of these variables for the release phase is not as 
good as the performance of the credit-to-GDP gap for the build up). This conclusion is in line 
with the previous work of Drehmann, Borio, Gambacorta, Jiménez and Trucharte (2010). They 
also denote the valuable side-benefit of this variable in restraining credit booms. Another 
conclusion obtained as a result of their work is that all indicators provide false signals and for 
that, there is no perfect mechanism based only in rules, being necessary some judgment in 
setting the buffer levels.  
   
3.1 Historical performance in Portugal: methodology 
 
To analyze the historical performance of the credit-to-GDP in Portugal it is used the 
methodology prescribed in the BCBS document “Basel Committee (2010), Guidance for 
national authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer”. 
 
This methodology consists in three main steps: 
 
1. Compute the credit-to-GDP ratio; 
2. Compute the credit-to-GDP gap; 
3. Transform the credit-to-GDP gap into the buffer add-on. 
 
1. Compute the credit-to-GDP ratio 
The credit-to-GDP ratio for the period   is calculated by the following formula: 
 
       
       
    
      
Equation 3 – credit-to-GDP ratio 
 
where      is domestic GDP in period   and         is the credit to the private sector in 
period   (both in nominal terms and on quarterly frequency). 
 
 





2. Compute the credit-to-GDP gap 
The credit-to-GDP gap is the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long term trend. For 
period   the gap is given by the formula: 
 
                    
Equation 4 – credit-to-GDP gap 
where        is calculated by the use of a one sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing 
parameter (λ) set to 400 0005. 
 
3. Transform the credit-to-GDP gap into the buffer add-on 
The size of the buffer add-on will depend on the credit-to-GDP gap compared to an upper and 
a lower threshold (BCBS suggests the values of 10 and 2 respectively). Specifically, the buffer 
add-on will be zero if the credit-to-GDP gap is below the lower threshold (2), will have its 
maximum value when the credit-to-GDP gap is higher than the upper threshold (10) and will 
vary linearly in between. 
 
After obtaining the periods for the build up and maximum value of the buffer using the 
previous methodology, these will be compared to the crisis period that began in the third 
quarter of 2008 and find if the build up of the buffer would occur as expected (according to 
BCBS (2010),  the build up phase should occur at least 2-3 years prior to a crisis and the buffer 
maximum value should be reached prior to a crisis).    
 
3.2 Historical performance in Portugal: data 
 
To perform the calculations, quarterly data of nominal broad credit to the private, non-
financial sector and nominal GDP was used from the fourth quarter of 1979 to the fourth 
quarter of 2011. In both cases, the source of the information was the Bank of Portugal (the full 
series are presented in annex 6.1). The credit-to-GDP ratio considers the volume of credit of 
the period and the sum of the last four quarters of the quarterly GDP. Given that according to 
the document “Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer”, 
“the indicator should breach the minimum at least 2-3 years prior to a crisis” and that the crisis 
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 A smoothing parameter (λ) of 1 600 was also used. Literature suggests that lambda is set according to the 
expected duration of the average cycle and the frequency of observation and for the business cycle and quarterly 
observations a value of 1600 is suggested (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997). For cycles with longer durations, such as the 
credit cycle, a higher value is considered appropriate. The empirical analysis by Drehmann, Borio, Gambacorta, 
Jimenez and Trucharte (2010) reveals that trends calculated using a lambda of 400 000 perform well in picking up 
the long-term trend in private-sector indebtedness.   





in Portugal began in 2008Q3, the period in analysis will be from 2002Q1 to 2011Q4. Following 
Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2011), the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter was computed 
for 2002q1 only considering the credit-to-GDP ratio up to this quarter and then for the 
following quarters, one record of data was added, assuring that for each period only available 
information at that period is considered in computing the trend. 
 
3.3 Historical performance in Portugal: results 
 
Table 6 below, presents the results of the credit-to-GDP gap in the period of 2002q1 to 
2011q3, using a one sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter (λ) set to 
400.000 to compute the trend. 
Time period (t) Credit GDP Ratio Trend Gap 
2002q1 182 025 34 681 134 103 30 
2002q2 185 287 35 146 134 106 28 
2002q3 188 540 35 359 135 108 27 
2002q4 191 038 35 381 136 111 25 
2003q1 193 210 35 426 137 114 23 
2003q2 196 994 35 639 139 116 23 
2003q3 195 298 35 989 137 118 19 
2003q4 194 228 36 418 135 121 15 
2004q1 197 833 36 743 137 123 14 
2004q2 201 315 37 301 137 125 13 
2004q3 203 250 37 499 137 127 11 
2004q4 202 973 37 770 136 128 8 
2005q1 204 081 37 997 136 130 5 
2005q2 209 906 38 638 138 132 6 
2005q3 212 776 38 627 139 133 6 
2005q4 217 076 39 007 141 135 6 
2006q1 225 878 39 573 145 137 8 
2006q2 234 820 40 025 149 139 10 
2006q3 238 400 40 364 150 141 9 
2006q4 244 273 40 893 152 143 9 
2007q1 249 495 41 936 153 145 8 
2007q2 259 042 42 168 157 147 10 
2007q3 265 853 42 302 159 149 10 
2007q4 275 138 42 914 162 151 11 
2008q1 282 079 43 072 165 153 12 
2008q2 292 955 43 144 171 156 15 
2008q3 296 051 43 137 172 158 14 
2008q4 298 718 42 631 174 160 13 
2009q1 303 807 41 862 178 163 15 
2009q2 307 964 41 908 182 165 16 
2009q3 309 277 42 272 183 168 15 
2009q4 314 781 42 462 187 171 16 





2010q1 314 107 43 030 185 173 12 
2010q2 319 077 42 874 187 175 12 
2010q3 323 988 43 494 189 178 11 
2010q4 329 618 43 273 191 180 11 
2011q1 336 548 43 220 195 183 12 
2011q2 335 303 42 761 194 185 9 
2011q3 332 996 42 799 194 187 7 
Table 6 – Credit-to-GDP gap (one-sided HP; Lambda 400 000) 
 
Observing the results, we can see that the gap was above the lower threshold of 2 for all 
periods and also that the maximum value did not occur in the 2 to 3 years’ time period 
preceding the crisis (see Figure 3). For these reasons, the conclusion should be that the credit-
to-GDP gap using a one sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter set to 
400.000 to compute the trend, did not performed as expected. One possible explanation may 
be the important vulnerabilities built up in the Portuguese economy in the late 90s/early 00s 
(e.g. strong credit growth, house prices growth, current account imbalances). Very likely, the 
gap was always above 2 because these vulnerabilities were never corrected, until recently. 
 
Figure 3 – Credit-to-GDP gap (one-sided HP; Lambda 400 000) 
As mentioned before, the same methodology was applied using a one sided Hodrick-Prescott 
filter with a smoothing parameter set to 1 600 to compute the trend, as suggested by Hodrick 
and Prescott (1997) for quarterly data. The results are shown in the following table and figure. 
Time period (t) Credit GDP Ratio Trend Gap 
2002q1 182 025 34 681 134 138 -5 
2002q2 185 287 35 146 134 140 -6 
2002q3 188 540 35 359 135 142 -7 





2002q4 191 038 35 381 136 143 -7 
2003q1 193 210 35 426 137 144 -7 
2003q2 196 994 35 639 139 145 -6 
2003q3 195 298 35 989 137 145 -8 
2003q4 194 228 36 418 135 145 -10 
2004q1 197 833 36 743 137 145 -8 
2004q2 201 315 37 301 137 145 -7 
2004q3 203 250 37 499 137 145 -7 
2004q4 202 973 37 770 136 144 -8 
2005q1 204 081 37 997 136 143 -7 
2005q2 209 906 38 638 138 143 -5 
2005q3 212 776 38 627 139 143 -4 
2005q4 217 076 39 007 141 143 -2 
2006q1 225 878 39 573 145 144 1 
2006q2 234 820 40 025 149 145 4 
2006q3 238 400 40 364 150 147 3 
2006q4 244 273 40 893 152 148 3 
2007q1 249 495 41 936 153 150 3 
2007q2 259 042 42 168 157 152 4 
2007q3 265 853 42 302 159 154 4 
2007q4 275 138 42 914 162 157 5 
2008q1 282 079 43 072 165 160 6 
2008q2 292 955 43 144 171 163 8 
2008q3 296 051 43 137 172 166 5 
2008q4 298 718 42 631 174 169 4 
2009q1 303 807 41 862 178 173 5 
2009q2 307 964 41 908 182 176 5 
2009q3 309 277 42 272 183 180 4 
2009q4 314 781 42 462 187 183 4 
2010q1 314 107 43 030 185 185 0 
2010q2 319 077 42 874 187 188 -1 
2010q3 323 988 43 494 189 190 -1 
2010q4 329 618 43 273 191 192 -1 
2011q1 336 548 43 220 195 195 0 
2011q2 335 303 42 761 194 196 -2 
2011q3 332 996 42 799 194 198 -4 
Table 7 – Credit-to-GDP gap (one-sided HP; Lambda 1 600) 






Figure 4 – Credit-to-GDP gap (one-sided HP; Lambda 1 600) 
These results suggest that with a smoothing parameter set to 1 600 to compute the trend, the 
lower threshold is reached in 2006q2, which is on the period of 2 to 3 years prior to the crisis 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). However the maximum buffer would not be 
reached prior to the crisis, suggesting that other thresholds should be used. Figure 5 shows an 
example for the lower and higher thresholds of 1 and 7, respectively. 
 
Figure 5 – Credit-to-GDP gap (one-sided HP; Lambda 1 600; Lower threshold = 1; Higher threshold = 7) 





In conclusion, the gap based on the trend computed with a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 
smoothing parameter set to 400 000 did not perform as expected and so it does not prove to 
be a perfect guide for Portugal. On the other side, the gap based on the trend computed with a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter set to 1 600 delivered good results,   
although new thresholds may be required. For example, setting these parameters to 1 and 7 
would allow the buffer to start the build up in 2006q1 and reach its maximum in 2008q2, 
complying with both the objectives of reaching the lower threshold at least 2 to 3 prior to the 
crisis and also reach the maximum buffer prior to a crisis.  
  
4 Capital requirements: How do banks adjust? 
 
After verifying the historical performance of the common guide credit-to-GDP, another 
question has to be answered in order to judge the effectiveness of the countercyclical capital 
buffer in Portugal: will higher capital requirements constrain credit growth?  
 
In this chapter the aim is to address this question, using a methodology based on the previous 
work of Francis and Osborne (2012), which studied the effects of regulatory capital 
requirements on capital, lending and balance sheet management of UK banks. They concluded 
that raising capital requirements may be less effective in the objective of constraining credit 
growth if banks can comply with them by using capital of lower quality and cost. 
 
Francis and Osborne (2012) use on the analysis capital requirements available at the UK 
supervisor, which include bank-specific and time-varying add-ons set in an approach similar to 
the one adopted by many countries under Pillar 2 of Basel II. Pillar 2, concerned with the 
supervisory review process, goes beyond the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and 
allow regulators in different countries some discretion in how rules are applied, taking into 
account local conditions and identified deficiencies. In Portugal this data is not available and 
there is no evidence, based on banks' annual reports, that Pillar 2 is actively used. To replicate, 
to some extent,  Francis and Osborne (2012) the recent changes in capital requirements for the 









4.1 Capital requirements: How do banks adjust? – Methodology 
 
As mentioned before, the methodology used to find the impact of capital requirements in the 
balance sheet management of Portuguese banks is based on the previous work of Francis and 
Osborne (2012), which relies on three main steps: 
1) Establish the target capital ratios of each bank; 
2) Measure surplus or deficit of capital ratio to target capital ratio (capitalization index); 
3) Use the capitalization index as an explanatory variable in regressions of bank balance sheet 
components.  
Below, are the details of each step: 
 
1) Establish the target capital ratios of each bank  
 
These target capital ratios depend on characteristics of each bank for the observed periods 
and idiosyncratic factors affecting the bank choices, and is modeled by the following formula: 
 
    
     ∑        
 
   
 
Equation 5 – Target capital ratio 
where,     
  is the target capital ratio of bank   in period  ,        are the characteristics of bank   
in period   and    is a fixed effect representing the idiosyncratic factors affecting bank  . 
  
The choice of the variables representing the characteristics of banks was also based on the 
work of Francis and Osborne (2012). The chosen variables were: 
 
a) (CR) Capital requirements 
As mentioned before, unlike the UK where capital requirements are bank-specific and 
time-varying, the minimum solvency ratio in Portugal remains unchanged and equal 
for all banks during the observation period. However, the minimum core tier 1 ratio 
was set to a minimum of 9% in 2011 and 10% from 2012 and beyond (Notice 3/2011 of 
Bank of Portugal). In practice, setting the minimum core tier 1 ratio above the 
minimum solvency ratio implies that banks must have higher solvency ratios and so, 
this variable assumes the value of 8% for all periods except for 2011 and 2012, where 
it assumes the values of 9% and 10%, respectively.  





b) (RISK) RWA/Total Assets 
This variable intends to represent the regulatory risk profile of the bank. As mentioned 
before, risk weighted assets are the bank’s assets and off-balance sheet exposures, 
weighted according to risk. The risk weight applied to each exposure must comply with 
the regulation set by national authorities.     
 
c) (PROVISIONS) Provisions/Total Assets 
This variable intends to represent the risk profile of the bank according to its own 
estimate. The economic value of each asset is its gross amount corrected by provisions 
that should represent the expected loss associated to the asset. Bank’s use their own 
models to determine this expected loss, which can be seen as proxy for risk incurred 
(higher levels of provision reflect a higher perception of risk).  
 
d) (SIZE) Demeaned value of the log of total assets 
This variable measures the relative size of each bank on the sample, because according 
to Francis and Osborne (2012), “larger banks may be better able to diversify risks, 
access funding and adjust capital compared with smaller institutions.” 
 
Francis and Osborne (2012) also included another two variables, not included in my analysis. 
The first was the tier 1 ratio over total capital, representing the weight of high quality capital 
on total capital. Because, in Portugal, the minimum core tier 1 ratio is higher than the total 
capital ratio this variable is not meaningful in the context.  
 
The second variable was the ratio of trading book to total balance sheet assets, to control for    
several business models in institutions with great trading activity. In the case of Portuguese 
banks, the trading book does not have materiality compared to the banking book, so this 
variable was excluded. 
 
Assuming that banks take time to adjust their capital towards the target, and again following 
Francis and Osborne (2012), it was considered a partial adjustment model, where the variation 
of the capital ratio in each period depends on the target capital ratio (    
 ) and the real capital 
ratio of the previous period (    
 ). The equation is as follows: 
 
             (      
        )       
Equation 6 – Partial adjustment model of target capital ratio 





where,      and        are the actual capital ratios of bank   in the periods   and    , 
respectively,       
  is the target capital ratio of bank   in period    , and      is the error term. 
 
Substituting Equation 5 into Equation 6 and rearranging gives the first equation of estimation: 
      (   )        (   ∑        
 
   
)       
Equation 7 – Equation of estimation of capital ratio 
 
Because Equation 7 was in fact estimated using one lag of the dependent variable and one lag 
of the explanatory variables, the equation is actually:  
                  ∑          
 
   
      
Equation 8 – Equation of estimation of capital ratio using one lag of dependent and explanatory variables 
where    =      in Equation 7,     = (   ) in Equation 7 and     =     in Equation 7. 
 
2) Measure surplus or deficit of capital ratio to target capital ratio (capitalization index) 
 
After estimating the coefficients in Equation 8, the target capital ratio is computed according 
to Equation 5, being the long run effect of each explanatory variable    given by: 
 
   
    
    
 
Equation 9 – Long run effect of each explanatory variable 
 
The computed target capital ratio is then used to calculate a measure of surplus or deficit of 
capital ratio to target capital ratio (capitalization index), according to the formula: 
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Equation 10 – Capitalization index 
 
where,      is the capitalization index of bank   in period  ,      is the actual capital ratio of bank 
  in period   and     
  is the target capital ratio of bank   in period  . 





3) Use the capitalization index as an explanatory variable in regressions of bank balance sheet 
components. 
 
In order to pursue its target capital ratios, banks may take measures that affect the numerator 
of the ratio, as raising or lowering the own funds levels or they can take measures that affect 
the denominator of the ratio, as changing the volume of loans, leveraging or de-leveraging and 
by changing the risk profile of the assets. 
 
To assess how banks in Portugal manage their balance sheets to move towards the desired 
capital ratio, the capitalization index (which depends on capital requirements) is used as an 
explanatory variable in regressions of some balance sheet and regulatory items. Following 
Francis and Osborne (2012), the dependent variables analyzed are the annual growth rate of 
loans, total assets, RWA and regulatory capital. Other explanatory variables also used in the 
regressions to control for other factors that may affect the dependent variables are: 
 
a. (DProvision) Change in the ratio of provisions to assets at period   
This variable is intended to control for general credit conditions (e.g. an increase of 
provisions represent a deterioration of the credit quality of borrowers). 
 
b. (NPL) Ratio of non-performing loans to assets at period   
This variable is intended to control for general credit conditions (e.g. an increase of 
non-performing loans represent a deterioration of the credit quality of borrowers). 
 
c. (VarGDP) Annual growth of GDP 
This variable is intended to control for general macroeconomic conditions. 
 
d. (VarECBR) Annual growth of European Central Bank (ECB) refi rate 
This variable is intended to control for general monetary conditions. 
 
e. (VarCPI) Annual growth of Portuguese Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
This variable is intended to control for general price conditions. 
 
The next four equations reflect some of the options available to banks for responding to 
capital regulation and achieving their internal capital targets. Three focus on how banks adjust 
through altering the denominator of their capital ratios, through changing total assets (TA), 





risk-weighted assets (RWA), or loans (LOANS). One assesses how banks revise capital ratios by 
altering the numerator directly through regulatory capital (REGK). 
 
                                                          
                                 
Equation 11 – Loans regression 
 
 
                                                                        
                
Equation 12 – Total assets regression 
 
 
                                                                         
                
Equation 13 – RWA regression 
 
 
                                                                          
                
Equation 14 – Regulatory capital regression 
 
where,             is the annual growth rate of Loans of bank   in period  , calculated as 
   (  (        )    (          )),          is the annual growth rate of Total assets of 
bank   in period  , calculated as    (  (     )    (       )),           is the annual 
growth rate of RWA of bank   in period  , calculated as    (  (      )    (        )), 
           is the annual growth rate of Regulatory capital of bank   in period  , calculated as 
   (  (       )    (         )),        is the capitalization index of bank   in period    , 
        is annual growth of GDP in period    ,          is annual growth of ECB refi rate 
in period    ,         is annual growth of CPI in period    ,               is the change in 
the ratio of provisions to assets of bank   in period  ,        is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to assets of bank   in period   and      is the error term. 
 





4.2 Capital requirements: How do banks adjust? – Data 
 
On this analysis, it was used yearly data from 2000 to 2012. A long dataset is necessary given 
the dynamic structure of the model and the nature of the issue analyzed (balance sheet 
adjustments). The macroeconomic variables were obtained from Bloomberg (CPI and ECB refi 
rate) and Bank of Portugal (GDP). The banking data was significantly harder to obtain and 
constituted the biggest challenge of the entire work and was also responsible for a 
considerable delay on its conclusion. The objective at the beginning was to obtain quarterly 
data from a single source for the majority of Portuguese banks and for that objective many 
sources were attempted, such as SNL (could not get access), Bloomberg (does not have 
sufficiently long series), Bankscope (does not have sufficiently long series), Banks Almanac 
(only has data starting in 2007), Bank of Portugal (the publicly and available data consists only 
on banks annual reports since 2006), Coface (does not have banking data), InformaD&B (does 
not have banking data), banks’ web sites (do not contain annual reports for all periods and 
some of the required variables are not always available). Given the constraints,  the only 
feasible solution was to collect annual data (consolidated level) from three different sources 
for the six biggest banks in the Portuguese banking system, excluding Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
(being a public bank, capital management does not necessarily pursue the same objectives of 
the remaining banking sector), which gives a sample size of 78 observations. 
 
The three sources sorted by the priority given for collecting data were Bankscope, Bloomberg 
and bank’s annual reports. 
 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation 8 of the first step (to 
establish the target capital ratios of each bank). As can be observed, banks have always held 
capital ratios above the minimum required, although the average gap is not considerable 
(about 2.7%). 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Unit 
CR 78 8.2308 0.5794 8.0000 10.0000 Percentage 
K 78 10.9554 1.3795 8.0200 15.0000 Percentage 
RISK 78 0.6856 0.0943 0.4700 0.8500 Ratio 
PROVISIONS 78 0.0061 0.0048 0.0005 0.0294 Ratio 
SIZE 78 0.0000 0.3260 -0.6078 0.5225 Ratio 
Table 8 – Descriptive statistics of step 1 variables 





Table 9 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in Equation 8 of the first step and 
the results are as expected. Being a function of RWA, RISK has a negative correlation with K, 
and for higher capital requirements (CR) the risk taken decreases, possibly reflecting the cost 
of capital. RISK has a positive correlation with PROVISIONS and SIZE, meaning that more risk is 
associated with higher levels of provisions and that bigger banks take more risks. CR is 
positively correlated with K, as it should be, and banks’ own perception of the risk taken 
(PROVISIONS) is correlated with higher capital ratios. The results also suggest that bigger banks 
tend to have higher capital ratios and lower levels of provisions.  
 
  K RISK CR PROVISIONS SIZE 
K 1.0000 
    RISK -0.1588 1.0000 
   CR 0.2453 -0.2309 1.0000 
  PROVISIONS 0.0706 0.0081 0.5553 1.0000 
 SIZE 0.1757 0.0257 0.0000 -0.2472 1.0000 
Table 9 – Correlation matrix of step 1 variables 
 
Table 10, below, shows some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions of 
the step three. The capitalization index (Z) is on average negative, which means that banks 
held, on average, less capital compared to the target. Z has also a disperse distribution, ranging 
from a minimum of -50.82% to a maximum of 38.04% and with a standard deviation of 19.94. 
Apart from the ECB refi rate, that on average decreased along the observation period, the rest 
of the variables presented a positive variation on average.      
  
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Unit 
Z 72 -8.1161 19.9428 -50.8200 38.0400 Percentage 
VarGDP 72 0.0233 0.0280 -0.0300 0.0600 Percentage 
VarECBR 72 -0.3333 0.8307 -1.5000 1.2500 Percentage 
VarCPI 72 0.0258 0.0120 0.0000 0.0400 Percentage 
Dprovision 72 0.0005 0.0034 -0.0121 0.0148 Ratio 
NPL 72 0.0182 0.0124 0.0023 0.0569 Ratio 
VarlnLOANS 72 6.3022 8.0768 -13.9700 24.9800 Percentage 
VarlnTA 72 6.3494 7.8773 -13.8600 24.1600 Percentage 
VarlnRWA 72 5.2468 9.6547 -13.6700 35.3600 Percentage 
VarlnREGK 72 7.0186 15.3359 -30.1400 48.6300 Percentage 
Table 10 – Descriptive statistics of step 3 variables 
 
The complete series used in the regressions of step one and two are presented in Annexes 6.2 
and 6.3. 





4.3 Capital requirements: How do banks adjust? – Results 
 
The results of the regression using Equation 8 are shown in Table 11, below. As can be 
observed, not all variables are statistically significant at the 10% level. RISK has a p-value of 
0.19 and PROVISIONS has a p-value of 0.12, slightly above the threshold of 0.10. The most 
statistically significant variables were K with a p-value of 0.01 and CR with 0.03. It is important 
for the analysis the significance of CR and the coefficient estimated, which means that capital 


















  -0.024 
 
(0.446) 
  2.792 
 
(1.744) 
  1.650* 
 
(0.963) 
  0.0244 
 
(0.446) 
  -6.229** 
 
(3.088) 






  Observations 72 
R-squared 0.411 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 11 – Results of the regression using Equation 8 (dependent variable: kt) 
As explained before, in the second step Z is computed using Equation 5, Equation 9 and 
Equation 10. Because some of the bank variables did not present statistically significance at 





the 10% level (Table 11),they were excluded from the calculation of the target capital ratio 
(e.g. RISK and PROVISIONS). 
 
The results presented in Table 12 were obtained using the computed Z as an input for the 
regressions using Equations 11 to 14 and also the rest of the explanatory variables already 
mentioned (VarGDP, VarECBR, VarCPI, DProvision and NPL). Although there is a positive 
association between the capitalization index (Z) and the variation of Loans, Total assets and 
RWA, the results do not present the necessary significance to take liable conclusions. On the 
other side there is a significantly negative association between the level of capitalization (Z) 
and regulatory capital, which seems to suggest that Portuguese banks tend to react to the 
raising of capital requirements by changing the numerator of the ratio. These finding are 
consistent with the capital increases that most banks did on the recent past (some of them 
with funds stemming from the Portuguese government). However, it is important to 
remember that capital requirements increased in Portugal during a crisis period, and further, 
the objective was not to act countercyclically, as clearly there was not a credit boom building 
up.   
 
Another negative and statistically significant association is observed between the variation of 
provisions and the variation of Loans, Total assets and RWA, suggesting that an increase in 
provisions (risk taken assessed by the bank) is associated with de-leveraging and the lowering 
of the risk profile. In fact, de-leveraging in the Portuguese economy is being driven by the 
increase in credit risk in the economy, which is forcing the banks to record more provisions and 
is thereby exerting strong pressure on profitability.  
 
In sum, tighter capital requirements seem to be addressed by banks through increases in 
capital rather than through de-leveraging. Although these results might imply that imposing an 
additional capital buffer will lead to additional capital increases, the fact that in Portugal 
capital requirements were increased pro-cyclically indicates that these results cannot be 
generalized and does not allow to conclude that increases of capital requirements during a 
credit boom due to the build up of the countercyclical buffer will necessarily lead to the same 
adjustment by banks. Nevertheless, given the lack of empirical evidence on this very important 
issue, I hope that these results help to shed some light on the possible adjustments made by 
banks following an increase in capital requirements. 
 





Variable VarLnLoans VarLnTA VarLnRWA VarLnRegK 
          
Z 0.0232 0.0618 0.0649 -0.666** 
 
(0.0386) (0.0615) (0.116) (0.249) 
VarGDP 48.73 27.81 107.6 138.3 
 
(37.16) (23.82) (59.22) (77.68) 
VarEcbR 1.707*** 1.767** 2.250 -2.248 
 
(0.416) (0.574) (1.474) (1.267) 
DProvision -1,032*** -715.6*** -1,085*** -1,828** 
 
(140.3) (138.1) (268.2) (540.3) 
NPL -157.0 -101.4 -66.55 -310.2 
 
(82.86) (99.31) (130.0) (339.8) 
Constant 8.723*** 8.323** 5.018 4.627 
 
(2.163) (2.233) (3.197) (7.277) 
     Observations 66 66 66 66 
R-squared 0.454 0.315 0.447 0.299 
Number of ID 6 6 6 6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




The main objective of this thesis is to assess if the implementation in Portugal of the 
countercyclical capital buffer present on the Basel III framework will have the desired effect of 
constraining excessive credit growth in good periods of the business cycle and allow to build 
the necessary capital buffers to be released in crisis, thus mitigating the possibility of credit 
crunches. 
 
The main objective was in practice divided in two smaller ones. The first one was to verify the 
historical performance of the common guide Credit-to-GDP gap proposed by the BCBS to signal 
the build up of the countercyclical capital buffer. The results showed that the guide can signal 
the build up of the buffer complying with the objectives of reaching the lower threshold at 
least 2 to 3 years prior to a crisis and also reach the maximum buffer prior to a crisis. However, 
some alterations to the methodology proposed may allow to improve the results. For instance, 
using a smoothing parameter set to 1 600 instead of 400 000 to compute the trend using a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter and changing the lower and upper thresholds to 1 and 7 may provide 
more useful signals to policy makers.       
 





The second objective was to assess if Portuguese banks would respond to an increase of 
capital requirements by contracting loan supply or by other means. To do so, it was used an 
approach based on the previous work of Francis and Osborne (2012), which studied the effects 
of regulatory capital requirements on capital, lending and balance sheet management of UK 
banks. The results suggest that Portuguese banks tend to react to capital requirement 
increases by raising the levels of regulatory capital. However, it should be borne in mind that 
capital requirements were increased during a crisis period (i.e. not with countercyclical 
objectives). As such, though this analysis hopefully provides unique evidence on how banks 
adjust capital, the results could only be fully generalized if more changes in capital 
requirements were observed. Nevertheless, given the lack of international evidence on the 
effects of macroprudential measures (and of the countercyclical capital buffer in particular), 
with this thesis I hope to provide important insights to bankers and policy-makers.  






6.1 Quarterly data of nominal credit and nominal GDP (values in m€) 
 
Time period (t) Credit GDP Ratio 
1979q4 4 240 1 780 - 
1980q1 4 520 1 867 - 
1980q2 4 722 1 996 - 
1980q3 4 929 2 076 64 
1980q4 5 386 2 149 67 
1981q1 5 749 2 298 67 
1981q2 6 125 2 324 69 
1981q3 6 408 2 520 69 
1981q4 6 792 2 644 69 
1982q1 7 128 2 749 70 
1982q2 7 513 2 855 70 
1982q3 7 937 3 022 70 
1982q4 8 535 3 195 72 
1983q1 8 891 3 454 71 
1983q2 9 369 3 667 70 
1983q3 9 835 3 906 69 
1983q4 10 743 4 115 71 
1984q1 11 058 4 264 69 
1984q2 11 634 4 550 69 
1984q3 12 316 4 791 70 
1984q4 13 045 5 032 70 
1985q1 13 277 5 320 67 
1985q2 13 727 5 591 66 
1985q3 13 906 5 810 64 
1985q4 14 406 6 057 63 
1986q1 14 607 6 329 61 
1986q2 14 959 6 789 60 
1986q3 15 383 7 078 59 
1986q4 16 206 7 336 59 
1987q1 16 627 7 574 58 
1987q2 16 863 7 976 56 
1987q3 17 135 8 203 55 
1987q4 17 687 8 522 55 
1988q1 18 347 9 111 54 
1988q2 18 857 9 430 53 
1988q3 19 452 9 831 53 
1988q4 20 294 10 444 52 
1989q1 20 191 10 680 50 
1989q2 20 691 11 158 49 
1989q3 21 330 11 678 49 
1989q4 22 758 12287 50 
1990q1 23 183 12 737 48 





1990q2 24 580 13 611 49 
1990q3 24 420 13 947 46 
1990q4 26 119 14 400 48 
1991q1 27 738 14856 49 
1991q2 29 476 15 523 50 
1991q3 30 694 16 030 50 
1991q4 33 189 16 520 53 
1992q1 33 477 17 224 51 
1992q2 35 326 17  814 52 
1992q3 36 954 18 047 53 
1992q4 39 516 18 283 55 
1993q1 40 223 18 063 56 
1993q2 42 114 18 415 58 
1993q3 42 563 18 809 58 
1993q4 44 433 19 126 60 
1994q1 44 814 19 592 59 
1994q2 45 982 20 141 59 
1994q3 46 261 20 361 58 
1994q4 49 356 20 842 61 
1995q1 52 473 21 545 63 
1995q2 54 833 21 899 65 
1995q3 55 702 22 071 65 
1995q4 58 088 22 326 66 
1996q1 58 479 22 634 66 
1996q2 61 561 23 100 68 
1996q3 63 545 23 704 69 
1996q4 67 996 23 778 73 
1997q1 70 210 24 473 74 
1997q2 74 056 25 114 76 
1997q3 77 652 25 626 78 
1997q4 82 168 25 934 81 
1998q1 84 678 26 590 82 
1998q2 90 923 27 395 86 
1998q3 95 373 27 978 88 
1998q4 102 736 28 414 93 
1999q1 108 309 28 969 96 
1999q2 115 140 29 403 100 
1999q3 122 117 29 931 105 
1999q4 129 577 30 358 109 
2000q1 136 601 31 069 113 
2000q2 147 115 31 369 120 
2000q3 155 686 32 295 124 
2000q4 160783 32 584 126 
2001q1 167 915 32 815 130 
2001q2 173 421 33 393 132 
2001q3 177 305 33 768 134 
2001q4 179 401 34 496 133 
2002q1 182 025 34 681 134 





2002q2 185 287 35 146 134 
2002q3 188 540 35 359 135 
2002q4 191 038 35 381 136 
2003q1 193 210 35 426 137 
2003q2 196 994 35 639 139 
2003q3 195 298 35 989 137 
2003q4 194 228 36 418 135 
2004q1 197 833 36 743 137 
2004q2 201 315 37 301 137 
2004q3 203 250 37 499 137 
2004q4 202 973 37 770 136 
2005q1 204 081 37 997 136 
2005q2 209 906 38 638 138 
2005q3 212 776 38 627 139 
2005q4 217 076 39 007 141 
2006q1 225 878 39 573 145 
2006q2 234 820 40 025 149 
2006q3 238 400 40 364 150 
2006q4 244 273 40 893 152 
2007q1 249 495 41 936 153 
2007q2 259 042 42 168 157 
2007q3 265 853 42 302 159 
2007q4 275 138 42 914 162 
2008q1 282 079 43 072 165 
2008q2 292 955 43 144 171 
2008q3 296 051 43 137 172 
2008q4 298 718 42 631 174 
2009q1 303 807 41 862 178 
2009q2 307 964 41 908 182 
2009q3 309 277 42 272 183 
2009q4 314 781 42 462 187 
2010q1 314 107 43 030 185 
2010q2 319 077 42 874 187 
2010q3 323  988 43 494 189 
2010q4 329 618 43 273 191 
2011q1 336 548 43 220 195 
2011q2 335 303 42 761 194 
2011q3 332 996 42 799 194 
 
  





6.2 Complete series used in the regression of the first step 
 
YEAR ID CR K RISK PROVISIONS SIZE 
2000 1 8 9.8000 0.7100 0.0036 0.0717 
2001 1 8 9.2000 0.7100 0.0032 0.0646 
2002 1 8 11.4000 0.6500 0.0025 0.0619 
2003 1 8 11.1000 0.6900 0.0029 0.0537 
2004 1 8 9.8000 0.6900 0.0029 0.0258 
2005 1 8 11.5100 0.6000 0.0016 0.0329 
2006 1 8 9.4500 0.6000 0.0009 0.0660 
2007 1 8 9.9100 0.6400 0.0020 0.0704 
2008 1 8 11.3200 0.6100 0.0028 0.0627 
2009 1 8 11.0000 0.5500 0.0032 0.0716 
2010 1 8 11.1000 0.5700 0.0023 0.0440 
2011 1 9 9.3000 0.5900 0.0045 0.0258 
2012 1 10 15.0000 0.5500 0.0060 0.0493 
2000 2 8 9.2000 0.7900 0.0028 0.5225 
2001 2 8 9.4000 0.7500 0.0033 0.4693 
2002 2 8 10.8000 0.7600 0.0051 0.4439 
2003 2 8 11.8000 0.7500 0.0070 0.4664 
2004 2 8 11.9000 0.7400 0.0019 0.4681 
2005 2 8 12.9000 0.7000 0.0015 0.4392 
2006 2 8 11.0500 0.7000 0.0016 0.4140 
2007 2 8 9.5600 0.7000 0.0030 0.4078 
2008 2 8 10.5000 0.7100 0.0057 0.4043 
2009 2 8 11.4700 0.6900 0.0057 0.3756 
2010 2 8 10.3000 0.6000 0.0073 0.3781 
2011 2 9 9.5000 0.5900 0.0142 0.3635 
2012 2 10 12.7000 0.5900 0.0188 0.3533 
2000 3 8 9.2900 0.7900 0.0075 0.2609 
2001 3 8 10.7500 0.7900 0.0048 0.2560 
2002 3 8 12.6400 0.8000 0.0067 0.2678 
2003 3 8 13.1300 0.7500 0.0085 0.2723 
2004 3 8 12.6600 0.8100 0.0070 0.2489 
2005 3 8 12.3000 0.7600 0.0044 0.2544 
2006 3 8 13.1000 0.7600 0.0031 0.2868 
2007 3 8 11.5000 0.7700 0.0031 0.2972 
2008 3 8 10.5000 0.7900 0.0036 0.3054 
2009 3 8 11.1400 0.7900 0.0066 0.3107 
2010 3 8 11.3000 0.8300 0.0042 0.3037 
2011 3 9 10.7000 0.8100 0.0075 0.2972 
2012 3 10 11.3000 0.7400 0.0104 0.3230 
2000 4 8 12.8000 0.6000 0.0160 0.0960 
2001 4 8 13.3000 0.5900 0.0039 0.1075 
2002 4 8 12.5000 0.6900 0.0043 0.0818 
2003 4 8 11.0000 0.6800 0.0044 0.0957 
2004 4 8 11.2000 0.6500 0.0039 0.0716 





2005 4 8 10.8000 0.6000 0.0020 0.0781 
2006 4 8 10.9000 0.6200 0.0005 0.0406 
2007 4 8 10.0000 0.6400 0.0030 0.0399 
2008 4 8 10.3000 0.6200 0.0012 0.0328 
2009 4 8 10.7000 0.5300 0.0021 0.0551 
2010 4 8 10.1000 0.4800 0.0034 0.0479 
2011 4 9 10.3000 0.5200 0.0057 -0.0039 
2012 4 10 11.4000 0.4700 0.0121 -0.0139 
2000 5 8 10.3000 0.6000 0.0093 -0.6078 
2001 5 8 9.2000 0.5300 0.0074 -0.5730 
2002 5 8 9.4000 0.7100 0.0080 -0.5645 
2003 5 8 9.7000 0.8300 0.0072 -0.6073 
2004 5 8 13.4000 0.7600 0.0061 -0.5234 
2005 5 8 8.8400 0.7400 0.0028 -0.5246 
2006 5 8 11.3000 0.8100 0.0028 -0.5236 
2007 5 8 10.3800 0.8500 0.0025 -0.5057 
2008 5 8 9.2200 0.8500 0.0042 -0.4610 
2009 5 8 10.0300 0.8500 0.0075 -0.4450 
2010 5 8 9.2400 0.8100 0.0064 -0.4194 
2011 5 9 8.0200 0.7500 0.0212 -0.4079 
2012 5 10 11.5100 0.7700 0.0294 -0.4538 
2000 6 8 9.7000 0.7500 0.0076 -0.3434 
2001 6 8 10.2600 0.7400 0.0103 -0.3243 
2002 6 8 10.6800 0.7000 0.0108 -0.2910 
2003 6 8 11.4000 0.6400 0.0121 -0.2807 
2004 6 8 11.4000 0.6400 0.0147 -0.2910 
2005 6 8 10.6800 0.6700 0.0052 -0.2800 
2006 6 8 9.8300 0.6600 0.0047 -0.2837 
2007 6 8 8.9500 0.7000 0.0050 -0.3097 
2008 6 8 11.4400 0.6200 0.0055 -0.3441 
2009 6 8 13.2500 0.5800 0.0084 -0.3680 
2010 6 8 12.7400 0.5600 0.0061 -0.3543 
2011 6 9 13.4900 0.6300 0.0067 -0.2748 
2012 6 10 13.5800 0.6200 0.0078 -0.2578 
 
  





6.3 Complete series used in the regression of the third step 
 
Year Id VarLnLoans VarLnTA VarLnRWA VarLnRegK Z VarGDP VarEcbR VarCPI DProvision NPL 
2001 1 13,6700 12,3700 11,8300 5.5143 -18,5000 0,0600 -1,5000 0,0400 -0,0004 0,0070 
2002 1 7,1400 3,4700 -4,0600 17.3789 0,6900 0,0500 -0,5000 0,0400 -0,0007 0,0099 
2003 1 6,7900 1,9300 7,0600 4.3953 -2,8600 0,0200 -0,7500 0,0200 0,0004 0,0091 
2004 1 8,1400 -1,5800 -1,3000 -13.7557 -16,8200 0,0400 0,0000 0,0200 0,0001 0,0086 
2005 1 9,7700 15,7800 1,9500 18.0323 -1,5500 0,0300 0,2500 0,0300 -0,0014 0,0098 
2006 1 15,9200 16,4900 16,0500 -3.6686 -16,1600 0,0400 1,2500 0,0300 -0,0006 0,0078 
2007 1 10,1400 13,1100 19,6900 24.4394 -11,6300 0,0500 0,5000 0,0300 0,0011 0,0073 
2008 1 7,4000 5,8800 1,0200 14.3273 0,0700 0,0200 -1,5000 0,0100 0,0008 0,0107 
2009 1 2,5300 9,8400 -0,5000 -3.3721 -1,7800 -0,0200 -1,5000 0,0000 0,0004 0,0118 
2010 1 0,4000 -3,8400 -0,0800 0.8240 -21,6100 0,0300 0,0000 0,0300 -0,0009 0,0129 
2011 1 -5,4200 -6,1000 -3,4600 -21.1573 -45,2900 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0400 0,0022 0,0160 
2012 1 -2,8900 3,6800 -2,5800 45.2253 -10,1900 -0,0300 -0,2500 0,0200 0,0016 0,0200 
2001 2 4,5600 1,7700 -3,0500 -0.8963 4,8800 0,0600 -1,5000 0,0400 0,0005 0,0115 
2002 2 5,4700 -1,7600 -0,8000 13.0850 16,3200 0,0500 -0,5000 0,0400 0,0018 0,0108 
2003 2 8,3400 9,0200 7,7800 16.6318 31,1300 0,0200 -0,7500 0,0200 0,0019 0,0136 
2004 2 4,4700 5,2300 3,7800 4.6265 32,5500 0,0400 0,0000 0,0200 -0,0051 0,0066 
2005 2 3,9600 7,4700 2,7300 10.8010 38,0400 0,0300 0,2500 0,0300 -0,0004 0,0066 
2006 2 6,5300 3,0900 2,4100 -13.0677 14,3300 0,0400 1,2500 0,0300 0,0000 0,0063 
2007 2 14,3900 10,6500 10,5800 -3.9029 -1,8900 0,0500 0,5000 0,0300 0,0014 0,0063 
2008 2 13,6400 6,8600 8,9000 18.2739 7,2700 0,0200 -1,5000 0,0100 0,0028 0,0090 
2009 2 0,9100 1,1900 -2,4900 6.3478 12,9700 -0,0200 -1,5000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0213 
2010 2 -1,2200 3,0900 -9,9100 -20.6688 -19,0900 0,0300 0,0000 0,0300 0,0015 0,0232 
2011 2 -6,6000 -5,2800 -7,1500 -15.2314 -38,8100 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0400 0,0070 0,0342 
2012 2 -6,7500 -4,0800 -4,0200 25.0112 -18,8700 -0,0300 -0,2500 0,0200 0,0045 0,0465 
2001 3 12,0100 12,8900 12,9900 27.5873 2,0800 0,0600 -1,5000 0,0400 -0,0027 0,0117 
2002 3 4,8700 6,8000 8,2400 24.4392 21,7600 0,0500 -0,5000 0,0400 0,0019 0,0133 
2003 3 0,9500 4,8500 -0,9500 2.8557 27,1700 0,0200 -0,7500 0,0200 0,0018 0,0127 
2004 3 8,9800 -0,5400 6,2100 2.5630 19,1900 0,0400 0,0000 0,0200 -0,0016 0,0128 
2005 3 10,5600 15,4000 9,0500 6.1653 16,5700 0,0300 0,2500 0,0300 -0,0026 0,0097 
2006 3 12,1500 16,3400 16,2000 22.5040 29,1900 0,0400 1,2500 0,0300 -0,0013 0,0080 
2007 3 18,8300 14,4800 16,6700 3.6483 14,9200 0,0500 0,5000 0,0300 0,0000 0,0074 
2008 3 11,0400 9,5300 12,1900 3.0973 6,0200 0,0200 -1,5000 0,0100 0,0005 0,0085 
2009 3 4,7300 9,0400 8,7100 14.6220 13,2600 -0,0200 -1,5000 0,0000 0,0029 0,0109 
2010 3 4,0200 0,8800 5,4700 6.8924 -9,8500 0,0300 0,0000 0,0300 -0,0023 0,0316 
2011 3 -2,6900 -3,4200 -5,0900 -10.5499 -29,7300 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0400 0,0032 0,0421 
2012 3 -1,6000 4,2100 -5,8700 -0.4098 -24,1500 -0,0300 -0,2500 0,0200 0,0029 0,0569 
2001 4 15,2000 16,6600 15,7700 19.5987 23,2400 0,0600 -1,5000 0,0400 -0,0121 0,0142 
2002 4 6,8000 -1,8500 13,1200 6.9166 12,4200 0,0500 -0,5000 0,0400 0,0004 0,0140 
2003 4 -13,9700 7,0400 5,7900 -6.9894 0,5300 0,0200 -0,7500 0,0200 0,0001 0,0126 
2004 4 23,0500 -0,7000 -4,5400 -2.7353 -0,4300 0,0400 0,0000 0,0200 -0,0005 0,0104 
2005 4 7,7400 15,6200 6,5500 2.9085 -3,2800 0,0300 0,2500 0,0300 -0,0019 0,0056 
2006 4 9,9900 0,2500 4,0300 4.9510 -6,3800 0,0400 1,2500 0,0300 -0,0015 0,0035 
2007 4 4,0200 11,9400 15,4900 6.8744 -14,1700 0,0500 0,5000 0,0300 0,0025 0,0023 
2008 4 7,0300 6,0100 3,0200 5.9783 -12,2800 0,0200 -1,5000 0,0100 -0,0018 0,0040 





2009 4 -1,3700 12,9300 -3,6000 0.2118 -6,6200 -0,0200 -1,5000 0,0000 0,0009 0,0057 
2010 4 0,8600 0,8700 -7,9600 -13.7308 -28,6600 0,0300 0,0000 0,0300 0,0013 0,0073 
2011 4 -4,1400 -13,8600 -6,7400 -4.7789 -40,8900 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0400 0,0023 0,0134 
2012 4 -3,8600 -4,0400 -13,6700 -3.5263 -35,0600 -0,0300 -0,2500 0,0200 0,0064 0,0231 
2001 5 17,1400 22,0400 9,0500 -2.2475 -30,2300 0,0600 -1,5000 0,0400 -0,0018 0,0130 
2002 5 13,7500 6,0500 35,3600 37.5102 -28,1200 0,0500 -0,5000 0,0400 0,0006 0,0146 
2003 5 -0,4000 -6,0300 8,8300 11.9726 -28,7900 0,0200 -0,7500 0,0200 -0,0009 0,0170 
2004 5 24,9800 24,1600 16,3200 48.6298 6,7300 0,0400 0,0000 0,0200 -0,0011 0,0127 
2005 5 10,6200 13,8700 11,4600 -30.1385 -29,6700 0,0300 0,2500 0,0300 -0,0033 0,0123 
2006 5 13,6400 9,1100 17,1400 41.6925 -10,0200 0,0400 1,2500 0,0300 0,0000 0,0196 
2007 5 20,1100 16,2100 21,4800 12.9917 -15,8200 0,0500 0,5000 0,0300 -0,0002 0,0227 
2008 5 18,3400 17,9500 18,0300 6.1794 -21,6100 0,0200 -1,5000 0,0100 0,0016 0,0256 
2009 5 12,5400 11,4700 11,3000 19.7242 -13,2300 -0,0200 -1,5000 0,0000 0,0033 0,0470 
2010 5 6,4200 8,4200 3,6500 -4.5538 -33,2500 0,0300 0,0000 0,0300 -0,0010 0,0245 
2011 5 -6,8900 0,7100 -7,1100 -21.2727 -50,8200 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0400 0,0148 0,0316 
2012 5 -9,0600 -12,3000 -9,8500 26.2751 -31,8500 -0,0300 -0,2500 0,0200 0,0081 0,0457 
2001 6 18,7200 18,4100 16,3300 21.9434 -21,4800 0,0600 -1,5000 0,0400 0,0026 0,0284 
2002 6 6,2100 11,7400 6,4400 10.4547 -15,5300 0,0500 -0,5000 0,0400 0,0006 0,0301 
2003 6 1,7000 6,2000 -2,1600 4.3610 -8,8900 0,0200 -0,7500 0,0200 0,0013 0,0369 
2004 6 4,9300 2,4800 2,5900 2.5915 -9,8300 0,0400 0,0000 0,0200 0,0026 0,0282 
2005 6 18,2400 16,6700 19,9400 13.4195 -14,5800 0,0300 0,2500 0,0300 -0,0095 0,0226 
2006 6 8,7700 8,0300 7,6300 -0.6672 -21,6800 0,0400 1,2500 0,0300 -0,0005 0,0186 
2007 6 6,5600 6,1000 10,8800 1.5037 -30,5200 0,0500 0,5000 0,0300 0,0003 0,0193 
2008 6 3,2400 -0,2800 -11,2000 13.3419 -14,1100 0,0200 -1,5000 0,0100 0,0005 0,0254 
2009 6 -1,4200 2,3100 -4,6000 10.0904 -2,7300 -0,0200 -1,5000 0,0000 0,0028 0,0337 
2010 6 -0,6600 5,6600 2,6600 -1.2678 -20,6600 0,0300 0,0000 0,0300 -0,0023 0,0316 
2011 6 15,0400 16,3700 27,0600 32.7819 -23,6000 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0400 0,0006 0,0383 
2012 6 -5,2500 2,2000 1,0800 1.7652 -22,1200 -0,0300 -0,2500 0,0200 0,0011 0,0425 
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